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Abstract
In this paper we extend the results of recent studies on the existence of equilibrium in
ﬁnite dimensional asset markets for both bounded and unbounded economies. We do not
assume that the individual’s preferences are complete or transitive. Our existence theorems
for asset markets allow for short selling. We shall also show that the equilibrium achieves a
constrained core within the same framework.
Keywords. Incomplete Preferences, Intransitive Preferences, Incomplete Markets, General
Equilibrium, Constrained Core, Convex Analysis
1 Introduction
In this paper, we extend the study of the existence and optimality of competitive equilibria to
a wider class of economies: the class of economies, suggested by Arrow (1951), in which the
asset market is possibly incomplete. Recent studies on this topic take the extension of general
equilibrium theory as its starting point, which is due to Arrow & Debreu (1954). The ﬁrst
equilibrium existence result when consumption sets are unbounded below was proven by Hart
(1974) under the assumption that consumers’ utility functions were Von Neumann-Morgenstern
and that their directions of improvement were positively semi-independent. Later, Werner (1987)
gave an existence result under the assumption that there exists at least one price for which there
are no-arbitrage opportunities for all consumers. Making fairly weak assumptions on preferences,
Nielsen (1989) obtained a very general result under the assumption that consumers’ directions
of improvement were positively semi-independent.
In general, arbitrage conditions are suﬃcient to guarantee existence of equilibria when short-
sales are allowed in asset exchange economies. For instance, Dana et al. (1999) proved an
equilibrium existence theorem, with consumption sets that are unbounded below, only assuming
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1that the individually rational utility set is compact. Recently, Le Van et al. (2001) introduced
consumption externalities into a general equilibrium model, where consumption sets are closed,
convex and possibly unbounded. They showed that a generalized condition of no unbounded
arbitrage is suﬃcient for the existence of equilibrium and necessary and suﬃcient for compactness
of the set of individually rational allocations.
The aim of the paper is to generalize the previous literature in a number of directions. First,
we shall show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in incomplete markets. It is well known
that even in the simplest case of an economy with incomplete markets, where there is only
one physical commodity1, equilibrium will, in general, fail to exist. This paper provides the
suﬃcient conditions on asset payoﬀs, preferences, and endowments under which the equilibrium
of the underlying economy exists when there is only one physical commodity.
Second, we shall not assume that the preferences are complete or transitive. For instance,
most investors in ﬁnancial markets are not single investors but rather corporate bodies. There-
fore, most investment decisions are collective decisions. If markets are complete, then all group
members would have the same preferences over investments. If markets are incomplete, then it
is not possible to evaluate market values of all feasible investment decisions from available price
system. As a result, even if the competitive conditions prevail, generically, investors will not
be unanimous over the choice of corporate investment plans, see for instance Duﬃe & Shafer
(1985) and Haller (1991). Likewise, diﬀerent investors will have diﬀerent preferences over the
corporate investment plans. In such cases, a corporate’s investment decision will be the outcome
of a collective decision process. Social choice theory implies that the outcome of such collective
decision processes may be incomplete or intransitive, if the processes are non-dictatorial.2
Third, under weak conditions on the strict preference relations, the existence result will
be extended to economies in which unrestricted short selling of assets is allowed and hence
the portfolio space is not necessarily bounded below, see for instance Milne (1976), Werner
(1987) , and Page & Wooders (1996). Thus, in our paper, existence is not standard since
the asset consumption set Ah is potentially unbounded. Under these generalizations, namely
incomplete markets, non-ordered preferences, and unbounded asset sets, we prove the existence
of competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we present the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare economics in such a framework.
We shall prove that if the portfolio space of an asset exchange economy is ﬁnite dimensional
and the aggregate endowment is strictly positive, then the allocation is in the Constrained Core
whenever the allocation is supported by the price system.
In the following section, we present the model. In Section 3, we prove the existence of
a competitive equilibrium when portfolio space is bounded. Then, in Section 4, we prove the
existence of equilibrium for the unbounded case. We also establish constrained Pareto optimality
of the equilibrium. Finally, the concluding section discusses some of the implications of these
1It is fairly standard to make such an assumption in the ﬁnance literature, see for instance Lintner (1965),
Sharpe (1964), Milne (1988), Kelsey & Milne (1995), Bettzüge (1998) and Kelsey & Yalcin (2007).
2Also, Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) can give rise to incomplete preferences. Knight (1921) distinguishes
between risk, where the probabilities are known and ambiguity, where probabilities are not known.
2results and contains some remarks about extensions of the analysis.
2 The Economy
In this section, we analyze the properties of competitive equilibrium in the context of a ﬁnite
asset exchange economy under uncertainty, where trade in assets is competitive. Economic ac-
tivity occurs over two time periods, t = 0;1. Uncertainty is described by states of the world,
indexed by s 2 S = f1;:::;Sg, a ﬁnite and non-empty set, and is resolved all in the second
period. There is only one physical commodity so that the ﬁrst period commodity space is R and
the second period contingent commodity space is RS making the total commodity space RS+1.
However, we shall consider in the sequel an exchange economy where second period actions by
consumers are restricted to trades in assets that oﬀer linear combinations of contingent com-
modities. Therefore, we shall treat the assets to be the objects of choice rather than examining
the contingent commodities explicitly.
There are a ﬁnite number of consumers, indexed by h 2 H = f1;:::;Hg. Each consumer h
has a state-contingent commodity consumption set Xh  RS+1.
Each agent h has a strict preference relation h deﬁned on Xh, that is irreﬂexive but may not
be complete or transitive. For each h 2 H and each x 2 Xh; let U(h;x) =





y 2 Xh : x h y
	
be the strict upper contour set and strict lower contour set
of x 2 Xh with respect to the preference relation h, respectively.
Consider the following assumptions on Xh and preferences deﬁned on Xh:
Assumption 2.1 (a) For each h 2 H, Xh is non-empty, closed, convex, and bounded below.
(b) Irreﬂexivity: For each h 2 H and each x 2 Xh; x = 2 U(h;x).
(c) Nonsatiation: For each h 2 H and each x 2 Xh, x 2 cl(U(h;x)); where “cl” stands for
the “closure”.
(d) Continuity: For each h 2 H and each x 2 Xh; the sets U(h;x) and L(h;x) are open
subsets of Xh:
(e) Convexity: For each h 2 H and each x 2 Xh; the set U(h;x) is non-empty and convex.3
2.1 Induced Preferences
Let there be J assets indexed by j 2 J = f1;:::;Jg. Consumer preferences on Xh generates
derived preferences over asset holdings. We shall refer to the latter as induced preferences.
Deﬁne the commodity space in the asset economy to be the space RJ+1, where there are J
assets and the ﬁrst period commodity (asset 0). One unit of the j th asset pays a pattern of
returns in contingent commodities, Zj = (Zjs)s2S 2 RS
+: For each h 2 H, let ah 2 RJ+1 be the
vector of asset holdings of consumer h where ah
j deﬁnes the number of the jth asset held by
3We have assumed, without loss of generality, that U(h;x) is convex and x
h = 2 U(h;x). Suppose not, then
we can replace 
h: X
h ! X
h by b 
h : X
h ! X
h , where b U(h;x) = conU(h;x) where con indicates convex
hull. The binary relation in question will still have open graph and by Assumption 2.1, x
h = 2 b U(h;x) (see Border
(1984)).
3consumer h. Let Z = [Z1;Z2;:::;ZJ] be the SJ matrix representing the market set of returns.
In order to derive consumer preferences over assets, let us deﬁne a function  : RJ+1 ! RS+1








The function  is linear and onto the range Q, which is a vector subspace of dimension (J + 1).
Deﬁne V h = Q \ Xh, where V h 6= ; since f0g  Q \ Xh. Deﬁne consumer h’s consumption set
in asset economy (feasible portfolio space) Ah by  1 : V h ! RJ+1, that is, Ah   1  
V h
.
Using  1; induced preferences a
h over assets can be derived from commodity preferences h
: In other words, assets are desired solely for the returns they yield in the second period, therefore,
preferences over assets are derived preferences. The next Lemma presents the properties of
induced preferences based on Assumption 2.1.
For each h 2 H and each ah 2 Ah; let U(a
h;ah) =






b ah 2 Ah : ah h b ah	
:
Lemma 2.2 Let Assumption 2.1 be satisﬁed and the following condition hold: for each x 2 V h,
9y 2 V h such that y h x.
Then, for each h 2 H;
(a) Ah is non-empty, closed, convex, and bounded below4;
(b) Irreﬂexivity: for each ah 2 Ah; ah = 2 U(h;ah);
(c) Nonsatiation: for each ah 2 Ah, ah 2 cl(U(h;ah)); where “cl” stands for the “closure”;
(d) Continuity: for each ah 2 Ah, the sets U(a
h;ah) and L(a
h;ah) are open subsets of Ah;
(e) Convexity: for each ah 2 Ah, the set U(a
h;ah) is non-empty and convex.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2.2 can be found in Milne (1976) (Lemma 1) which was given
for the weak preference relation. In our case, this involves a trivial modiﬁcation for the strict
preference relation. Therefore, we will omit the proof.
3 Equilibria in Bounded Economies
In this section, we wish to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy where
arbitrary bounds are imposed on trades. Then, in Section 4, we prove existence in general by






h2H be an asset exchange economy in which each consumer h has an
asset consumption set Ah, an initial endowment of assets ah 2 RJ+1, and a preference relation
a
h on Ah: Consumer h can trade ah to obtain a new portfolio of assets. Let q 2 RJ+1nf0g be
4The assumption that each A
h is closed and bounded below can be replaced by the assumption that each A
h
is compact, which is standard, see Debreu (1959).
4the price vector for trades in asset exchange economy. Let consumer h’s budget set for a given
price system q 2 RJ+1nf0g be
Bh (q) =
n


















be the attainable state of the economy.





h2H is a collection (a;q)
of asset holdings a = (ah)h2H 2 
 and prices q 2 RJ+1nf0g such that for each h 2 H,
a) ah 2 Bh (q) ;
b) U(a
h;ah) \ Bh (q) = ;.






h2H ; ﬁrst, we will construct an associated economy b E =






as described below. Then, we will show that by Shafer (1976), a competitive equilibrium (b a; b q)
exists for economy b E: Finally, we will prove that this equilibrium is also an equilibrium for E:
Since, for each h 2 H, Ah is bounded below, let b 2 RJ+1 be such that for each h 2 H and







Let b 2 RJ+1 be such that X
h2H
ah < b: (3.2)
For each h 2 H; let
b Ah =
n
ah 2 Ah : ah  b   b
o
:
Let b A =
Q
h2H b Ah.
Lemma 3.2 If a = (ah)h2H 2 b A \ 
; then for each h 2 H; ah  b   b.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there is b h 2 H and j 2 J such that a
b h














j > bj (3.3)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that a 2 




j > bj; which contradicts (3.2).
By Lemma 3.2, we have the following result:
Corollary 3.3 If a = (ah)h2H 2 b A \ 
; then a 2 int b A and for each h 2 H; ah 2 int b Ah.
5We will only sketch the proof of the existence of an equilibrium for b E since it is standard.












For each h 2 H; let b 
a
h be the asset preference of agent h associated with the upper contour






: The economy b E =







constructed satisﬁes the following conditions: For each h 2 H,
i. b Ah is non-empty, convex, and compact;
ii. ah 2 int b Ah;
iii. For each ah 2 b Ah, the sets U(b 
a
h;ah) and L(b 
a
h;ah) are open subsets of b Ah;
iv. For each ah 2 b Ah, the set U(b 
a
h;ah) is non-empty and convex;
v. For each a = (ah)h2H 2 b A \ 
 and each h 2 H; ah 2 bd(U(b 
a
h;ah)), where “bd” stands
for the“boundary”.
Therefore, by Shafer (1976), b E has an equilibrium (b a; b q), that is, b a 2 
, q 2 RJ+1nf0g;
and for each h 2 H;
a) b ah 2 b Bh (q) =
n





h;b ah) \ b Bh (q) = ;.
Next, we show that if for each h 2 H; Ah and a
h satisfy the conditions listed in Lemma 2.2,





h2H has a competitive equilibrium
that coincides with the equilibrium of economy b E =













Proof. Clearly, for each h 2 H; b ah 2 b Bh (q)  Bh (q): Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that
for each h 2 H; U(a
h;b ah) \ Bh (q) = ;.
Assume, by contradiction, that there is h 2 H such that U(a
h;b ah) \ Bh (q) 6= ;:
Let e ah 2 U(a
h;b ah) \ Bh (q). Then, for each 0 <  < 1, deﬁne ah









Since fb ah;e ahg  Bh (q); we have q  b ah  q  ah and q  e ah  q  ah: Then, for each
0 <  < 1,
q  ah
  q  ah: (3.4)
Since b a 2 b A \ 
; by Corollary 3.3, b ah 2 int b Ah. Therefore, there exists suﬃciently small b 
such that ah
b  2 b Ah, which by (3.4), implies that ah
b  2 b Bh (q): Then, ah
b  2 U(b 
a
h;b ah) \ b Bh (q),
which contradicts condition (b) for (b a; b q) to be an equilibrium for b E. This completes the proof.
64 Equilibria in Unbounded Economies
The fact that we treat assets as claims to contingent consumption in the second period has an
important eﬀect on the problem of the existence of competitive equilibria. In this section, we
will allow for the possibility that consumers can go arbitrarily short in asset trading. Since
consumers are allowed to sell assets short, we will work with portfolio spaces without a prior
lower bound. Thus, we shall provide a basic result that shows the existence of a competitive
equilibrium in an economy with unbounded asset trade sets.
For each h 2 H; let Xh = RS+1
+ be the consumption possibility set of consumer h: As before,
a portfolio of assets is deﬁned as a vector ah 2 RJ+1: We shall assume that ah
j may be positive
or negative. Deﬁne sp(Z0) to be the span of (Z0): In the presence of asset markets with an
incomplete structure, the consumption set of each consumer h can be speciﬁed as follows:
X h = Xh \
n
xh 2 RS+1





that is, X h is the set of contingent-commodity bundles attainable by way of the exchange of
assets. Asset markets so constructed may be incomplete in the sense that the available assets
do not span Xh. For each consumer h 2 H; let the consumption set in the unbounded asset
economy be as follows:
Ah =
n
ah 2 RJ+1 : Z0ah 2 X h
o
;




Notice that Ah is assumed to have no lower bound. Also, note that since Xh = RS+1
+ for




Assumption 4.1 For each h 2 H, the initial asset endowment of h; ah 2 RJ+1 is in the interior
of Ah, that is, ah 2 intAh.
We need the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.2 Given a set X, we say that d 2 X is a direction of recession for X if for any
x 2 X, the ray fx + d :   0g is also in X.
Let O+X = fd : x + d 2 X; x 2 X;   0g be the set of all recession directions of X.5
Alternatively, O+X = fy : X + y  Xg:
If X is a closed convex set, then O+X is a closed convex cone containing the origin. Note
that X is closed and bounded if and only if O+X = f0g.
Therefore, for each h 2 H and each Ah; the recession cone O+Ah corresponding to Ah is a
closed convex cone containing the origin.
Since each unit of asset j 2 J is a contract that promises to pay a ﬁxed non-negative vector
Zj 2 RS
+, and assuming that consumer h has no other source of wealth in the second period,
one can obtain the following result.
5See Section 8 in Rockafellar (1970).
7Lemma 4.3 Assume that rank(Z0) = J+1 and for each h 2 H; Xh = RS+1
+ . Then, the derived





Proof. By deﬁnition, for each h 2 H and each ah 2 Ah; Z0ah  0: Hence,
 Ah =
n
ah 2 RJ+1 : Z0ah  0; Z0 semi-positive,   ah 2 Ah
o
:
Hence, if ah 2 Ah \
 
 Ah
, then Z0ah = 0. This equality and the fact that rank(Z0) = J + 1
together imply ah = 0. Hence, (i) Ah \
 
 Ah
= f0g: Note that (ii) 0 2 [O+Ah \ O+( Ah)]:




Hence, (i), (ii), and (iii) together imply that for each h 2 H; O+Ah \ O+  
 Ah
= f0g: Since
for each pair fh;h0g  H; Ah = Ah0





h2H denote the unbounded asset exchange economy where each con-
sumer h 2 H has an asset consumption set Ah  RJ+1; preferences a
h over Ah; and an
endowment of assets ah 2 Ah. Consumer h’s preferences over Ah are speciﬁed by a strict
preference relation a









b ah 2 Ah : aha
hb ah	
: Throughout, we shall
assume that for each ah 2 Ah; U(a
h;ah) exhibits the following properties:
Assumption 4.4 For each h 2 H and each ah 2 Ah;
(a) ah = 2 U(a
h;ah);
(b) ah 2 cl(U(a
h;ah)); where “cl” stands for the “closure” 6;
(c) The sets U(a
h;ah) and L(a
h;ah) are open subsets of Ah;
(d) The set U(a









be the set of attainable economies when
asset sets are unbounded. Let Q =

q 2 RJ+1 : kqk  1
	
be the set of relative prices. Note that
Q is compact. Let Bh (q) =

ah 2 Ah : q  ah  q  ah	
:





h2H is a collection
(a;q) of asset holdings a = (ah)h2H 2 
u and prices q 2 Q such that for each h 2 H,
a) ah 2 Bh (q) ;
b) U(a
h;ah) \ Bh (q) = ;.
We need the following deﬁnition which follows from Debreu (59).
Deﬁnition 4.6 Cones A1;:::;AH (with vertex 0) are said to be positively semi independent if
PH
h=1 ah = 0 and for each h 2 H; ah 2 Ah together imply that for each h 2 H; ah = 0.
Obviously, two cones Ah and Ah0
with vertex 0 are positively semi independent if and only if Ah
\Ah0
= f0g:





+ (1   )a
h h a
h for all  2 (0;1].
8Clearly, the set of attainable states 
u of the asset exchange economy is closed and convex.
Since for each h 2 H; Ah may be unbounded, A maybe unbounded. To show that 
u is bounded,
by Deﬁnition 4.2, it is suﬃcient to prove that O+
u = f0g.
Proposition 4.7 Given an unbounded economy Eu, the set 




a 2 RH(J+1) : 
u + a  
u	
. Let a = (ah)h2H 2 O+
u and
b a = (b ah)h2H 2 
u. Since O+
u  
u, then a + b a 2 






























Next, we show that O+A1;:::;O+AH are positively semi-independent. Note that for each




= f0g. Hence, by Deﬁnition 4.6, for each pair fh;h0g  H, cones O+Ah
and  O+Ah0
are positively semi-independent. In other words, (i) O+A1;:::;O+AH are positively
semi-independent.
Finally, let a = (ah)h2H 2 O+
u which implies (ii)
P
h2H ah = 0. Since 
u  A, then
a 2 O+
u  O+A 
Q
h2H(O+Ah). This implies that (iii) for each h 2 H, ah 2 O+Ah:
By Deﬁnition 4.6, (i), (ii), and (iii) together imply that for each h 2 H, ah = 0: Therefore
O+
u = f0g: By Deﬁnition 4.2, 
u is bounded. This completes the proof.







with n  1, such that for each h 2 H,
1. and each n  1, b Ah
n  b Ah
n+1;
2. limn!1 b Ah
n = Ah;







By Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975), for each n  1, there exists (a
n;q
n) 2 
u  Q which is an





u  Q. Note that

u is closed and by Proposition 4.7 it is bounded. Since 















Proof. Note that since 










n=1  Q; then a 2 
u and q 2 Q.
9First, we show that, for each h 2 H, ah 2 Bh (q). Suppose, by contradiction, that there is
h 2 H such that ah = 2 Bh (q); that is, q  ah > q  ah. Since (a;q) = limn!1 (a
n;q
n); for
n suﬃciently large, one must have q
n  ah
n > q
n  ah, a contradiction to the fact that (a
n;q
n) is
an equilibrium for b En:
Next, we show that for each h 2 H, U(a
h;ah) \ Bh (q) = ;. Let h 2 H:
a) Let e ah 2 Ah be such that q  e ah < q  ah. This implies, for suﬃciently large n, that
e ah 2 Ah
n and q
n  e ah  q
n  ah: Hence, e ah 2 Bh (q
n). Since (a
n;q
n) is an equilibrium for b En;
then e ah = 2 U(a
h;ah
n ). Since for each n  1, b Ah
n  b Ah
n+1 and limn!1 b Ah
n = Ah, then e ah = 2
U(a
h;ah).





n=1  Ah such that q  e ah
n < q  ah for all n  1 and limn!1 e ah
n = ah.
For suﬃciently large n, e ah
n 2 Ah: Hence, by part (a), q  e ah
n < q  ah which implies e ah
n = 2
U(a
h;ah): Since limn!1 e ah
n = ah; then ah = 2 U(a
h;ah): Therefore, U(a
h;ah) \ Bh (q) = ;.
This completes the proof.
4.1 Optimality of Competitive Allocations
There is no reason to expect an equilibrium allocation to be Pareto optimal. In fact, it is Pareto
optimal, in general, only if the market structure is essentially complete. Next, we shall give a
deﬁnition of Pareto optimality which is a special case of what is referred to as Constrained Core,
since it only excludes Pareto improvement brought by exchanging the existing assets. Note that
an element of the constrained core is constrained Pareto optimal.
Deﬁnition 4.9 A Constrained Core with respect to the preference proﬁle (a
h)h2H is an asset
portfolio allocation (ah)h2H such that there does not exist an allocation (ah)h2H and a non-






Next result adapts the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare to the asset exchange economy
setting we study.




h2H ; every competitive equilibrium
(a;q) is in the Constrained Core.









h2I ah and for each h 2 I; ah 2 U(a
h;ah). For each h 2 I; since U(a
h
;ah) \ Bh(q) = ;, then ah = 2 Bh(q); that is, q:ah > q:ah. Summing over h 2 I, we get
q P
h2I ah > q P






In this paper, we have given simple and direct equilibrium existence results for an asset exchange
economy when unlimited short selling was allowed. We assumed that consumer preferences were
10given by an irreﬂexive binary relation with open graph, that preferences were possibly incomplete
or intransitive, and that the portfolio space was non-compact and ﬁnite dimensional. Our study
therefore generalizes various results in the existing literature of economic theory.
Some comments are in order. First of all, in the proof of existence for an unbounded economy,
it was assumed that there is an independent set of asset returns. This assumption ensures the
result of Lemma 4.3, and rules out the possibility of a consumer taking an unbounded position
in dependent assets. With dependent assets, it is reasonable for the consumer to issue a set
of dependent assets that give the same returns as another asset held long, without violating
contractual feasibility, see Milne (1976). In general, a dependent asset equilibrium can easily
be derived from an independent asset equilibrium by taking appropriate linear combination of
quantities and prices of independent assets, see Milne (1988) and Kelsey & Yalcin (2007).
Second, since the asset market is possibly incomplete and has a competitive equilibrium, it
follows that the asset economy achieves a Pareto Optimal allocation of resources which coincides
with the notion of a Constrained Optimum due to Diamond (1967).
Finally, the obvious limitation of the model is that the analysis has been restricted to a
one-physical commodity case. Inclusion of many commodities would introduce the possibility of
commodity price uncertainty in the second period. Despite this restriction, we believe that the
model provides some useful implications for the pure theory of ﬁnancial markets before more
complicated assumptions are introduced (see, for instance, Bettzüge (1998)).
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